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In the fall of 2002, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique convened a small group 
of high-level experts on nuclear policy issues to discuss the consequences of 
September 11 and of the “war on terrorism” for nuclear debates. Participants met in 
Paris on September 26-27, 2002, and later provided papers which are reproduced 
here. 
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NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES – GLOBAL 
DIMENSIONS AND SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
 
Frank Umbach* 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since September 11, 2001 nuclear, biological and chemical weapons pose a 
greater threat at any time before. In the 1960s, security experts anticipated that 
by the turn of the century 40-80 states would possess nuclear weapons. Today, 
only eight have acquired them: USA, Russia, China, France, Great Britain, 
Israel, India and Pakistan. Four countries – South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan — had given up their nuclear ambitions during the last decade.1 
 
While nuclear power provides nearly 17 percent of the world’s electricity 
demand2, it is also the back door through which determined states could go to 
acquire nuclear weapons. As the result of civil and military programmes, the 
world has an estimated 3,000 tonnes of weapon-grades uranium and plutonium 
that can fall in the hands of international terrorists or so-called “rogue states” 
with nuclear ambitions. This amount of fissile material is enough to make 
thousands of bombs. But it is not all in secure storage — particularly not in 
Russia and other former Soviet states. In addition to dangers of stolen fissile 
material, attacked nuclear facilities by terrorists could release catastrophic 
amounts of radiation. 
 
In some European states (such as Germany), civilian nuclear power 
programmes will be given up in one or two decades due to high costs, fears of 
radiation, and unresolved problems in nuclear waste storage.3 If those nuclear 
                                                 
*  Senior Research Fellow for Foreign, Security, Military and Energy Policies and Head of the 
Asia-Pacific Programme at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP), Berlin. The analysis is the result of an ongoing research project, funded 
by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, on the future relationship between EU and China. 
1  See in detail Joseph Cirincione/Jon B. Wolfsthal/Miriam Rajkumar, “Deadly Arsenals. 
Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2002). 
2  See OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002” (Paris 2002: OECD/IEA, 2002), here p. 128. 
3  See John V. Mitchell/Peter Beck/Michael Grubb, “The New Geopolitics of Energy” 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Energy and Environmental Programme, 
1996), pp. 125 ff.; Peter Beck/Malcolm Grimston, “Future of Nuclear Energy – Powerful 
 
 
 
 
 
programmes will end, it also will reduce at least the amount fissile material in 
Europe as well as the infrastructure as a potential targets for international 
terrorist groups. But at the same time, it may also create new problems for 
Europe’s energy security. While the EU’s dependence on energy imports 
(mainly oil and gas) fell from 60 percent of energy consumption in 1973 to 50 
percent in 1999, the present strategic trends indicate the worrying prospect that 
this dependence may rise again to 70 percent by 2030 as Europe increasingly 
rejects indigenous coal and nuclear power.4 
 
Meanwhile, the prospect of a widespread climate change resulting from an 
increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere has become 
a major global concern. Against the background that global energy demand 
may rise dramatically in the 21st century and that nuclear power produces 
virtually non GHG emissions, it could, therefore, be in important energy source 
of future strategies to reduce GHG emissions.5 Hence it can also help to 
strengthen Europe’s and the global energy security by diversifying the energy 
mix and reducing high dependencies from fossil energy sources (i.e. oil and 
gas) imports from highly unstable regions (both politically and socio-
economically), particularly the Middle East/Persian Gulf and Central 
Asia/Caspian Basin. 
 
In 1999, nuclear energy supplied more than one sixth of global electricity and a 
substantial 30 percent of electricity in Europe. But in Eastern Europe and the 
Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union, most nuclear 
power plants have already operated for more than half of their original design 
lifetimes. That is one of the reasons why Russia and other NIS will build new 
nuclear power stations in the next decades. 
 
In other parts of the world such as in Russia and Asia, nuclear power 
programmes will either increase or initiated for the very first time in their 
countries. This may increase additional dangerous dimensions for the global 
security of the nuclear infrastructure and safe storage of fissile material. If may 
also offer new possibilities for nuclear ambitions of those countries. But at the 
same time it can also help to strengthen Europe’s and the global energy security 
by diversifying the energy mix and reducing high dependencies from fossil 
energy sources (i.e. oil and gas) imports from highly unstable regions (both 
politically and socio-economically), particularly the Middle East/Persian Gulf 
and Central Asia/Caspian Basin. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Issues”, The World Today, January 2001, pp. 25-27 and Roland Eggleston, “Germany: Plan to 
End Nuclear Power Raises Some Questions”, RFE/RL Analyses, 16 June 2000. 
4  See European Commission (Ed.), “Green Paper. Towards a European Strategy for the 
Security of Energy Supply”, Luxembourg, November 2000 (COM(2000)769 final).  
5  See Bob van der Zaan, “Nuclear Power and Global Warming”, Survival, Autumn 2000, pp. 
61-71 and Richard Rhodes/Dennis Beller, “The Need for Nuclear Power”, Foreign Affairs, 
January-February 2000, pp. 30-44. 
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Against this ambivalent background of present strategic trends, I will give an 
overview of the contradicting developments in regard to the global use of the 
civilian nuclear energy. Thereby, I will pay particular attention to the nuclear 
programmes in Russia and those in North- and Southeast Asia where the 
civilian use of nuclear energy will be expanded in the mid-term future. In this 
light, I will also discuss some of the potential nuclear proliferation threats and 
dangers linked with the civilian nuclear programmes as well as the security 
aspects in the context of international terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). 
Civilian Use of Nuclear Energy World-wide and in Europe 
At present, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation around the world and 
additional 32 are being build — particularly in Asia and Eastern Europe. In 
Western Europe, around 150 nuclear power plants are producing 
approximately 30 percent of their electricity, whereas in the United States 188 
nuclear reactors are providing 20 percent and in Canada 12 percent of their 
national electricity demand. The expansion of the European programmes of the 
civilian nuclear energy use followed the sharp increase in international oil and 
natural prices in 1973 which caused a thorough rethinking in the national 
energy strategies of the European states. In Western Europe, however, five of 
eight EU-states which have nuclear programmes, have declared a moratorium 
for the future use of nuclear energy. Only France (covering 79% of its electricity 
demand by nuclear energy), Great Britain (25%) and Finland have no intention 
to give up their civilian nuclear power programmes.6 Germany (which 
produces 32% of its electricity by nuclear power) has pronounced to end its 
nuclear programmes in the year 2021. But whether renewable energy sources 
will be able to substitute the electricity generated today by nuclear power is 
highly uncertain.7 According to the newest “World Energy Outlook 2002” of the 
OECD/IEA, for instance, renewable energy will play a growing role in the 
world’s primary energy mix (and with non-hydro renewables growing faster 
than any other primary energy source), fossil fuels will remain the primary 
sources of global energy in the mid-term perspective. They will make up more 
than 90 percent of the increase in the global energy demand, rising from 75 
million barrel per day (mb/d) to 120 mb/d in 2030.8 
 
Presently, renewable energy sources are generating only 2-3 percent of its 
energy consumption in Germany (with water power almost 5%), almost 7 
percent in the United States and 8 percent world-wide. Even many optimistic 
scenarios of the rising global energy consumption assume that these renewable 
energy sources may be able to provide a greater part of the energy and 
electricity generation up to 30-50 percent only after the year of 2030 — despite 
                                                 
6  See Breffni O’Rourke, “Finland, Bucking Energy Trends, Calls for More Nuclear Power”, 
RFE/RL Research Analysis, 14 March 2002. 
7  See also Stanley R. Bull/Lynn L.Billman, “Renewable Energy: Ready to Meet its Promise?”, 
The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2000, pp. 229-244. 
8  See OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002”, p. 27 f. 
 
 
 
 
 
the forecast that it will grow faster than any other primary energy source, at an 
average rate of 3,3 percent annually until then.9 
 
Nonetheless, Germany (with 19 nuclear power plants), Sweden (12 nuclear 
power stations), Belgium (7 nuclear reactors), Switzerland (5 nuclear power 
plants) and Belgium (7 reactors until 2025) as the latest EU state have declared 
to phase out their civilian use, whereas the United States, France (59 nuclear 
reactors), Japan (53), Great Britain 35 and Russia (29) will maintain their present 
civilian nuclear reactors or even expand the nuclear energy. Austria has 
suspended electricity imports from the Czech Republic to protest against the 
Temelin plant which produces one-fifth of the Czech Republic’s energy 
demands. In general, the EU depends upon nuclear energy to generate 14 
percent of its electricity power. Its gradual abandonment can leave Europe 
chronically short of energy and electricity. If renewable energy will not be able 
to substitute nuclear energy when the nuclear power reactors are phase out 
until 2021 in Germany and other states, Europe will become even more 
dependent on oil and gas imports in the future than today because coal plants 
face similar environmental pressure as Europe implements the Kyoto 
Protocol.10 Those oil and imports will come primarily from Russia, the Middle 
East and Central Asia – the latter two regions are highly unstable both 
politically as well socio-economically. The other alternative option for 
Germany, for instance, is to import electricity from nuclear plants in France, the 
Czech Republic or Ukraine and Russia as probably the cheapest supplier. Such 
a development reveals one of the inherent contradictions of a national based 
decision to phase out the use of civilian nuclear energy: Germany, Sweden and 
other beginning to close the most secure nuclear plants, whereas in the future 
they might be forced to import nuclear electricity from the most unsafe nuclear 
power plants existing in Europe. 
 
Against this background, the main conclusion of the so-called “Green Paper” of 
the EU”, adopted on 29 November 2000 as the first major review of energy 
policy since the 1970s, is that the EU can only meet its climate change goals and 
avoid risky dependence on foreign oil and gas imports (especially not from 
“rogue states” like Iraq and Iran) if it takes drastic measures to curb energy 
consumption while keeping the nuclear option open. The “Green Paper” 
reminds European politicians, for instance, that avoiding 300m tonnes of carbon 
every year is equivalent to the emissions of 75 million cars, by using nuclear 
energy.11 
                                                 
9  See OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002” (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002), p. 27 f.; Winand 
von Petersdorff, FAZ, 14.5.2002, p. 3 (English edition of the IHT); see also IAEA, “Climate 
Change and Nuclear Power”, Vienna 2000, here p. 2 and Tony Weslowsky, “EU: Energy 
Deregulation May Be Bad News for Nuclear Power”, RFE/RL Analyses , 1 November 2000. 
10  See also Andrew Taylor, Financial Times , 27 June 2001, p. 8. 
11  See European Commission (Ed.), “Green Paper. Towards a European Strategy for the 
Security of Energy Supply”, adopted on 29 November 2000, COM (2000) 769 final, Brussels 
2001. 
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Table 1 - Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation (April 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IAEA, “Climate Change and Nuclear Power”, Vienna 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst the EU Commission hoped to initiate new debates on its energy security, 
the effect of the “Green Paper” in regard to public debates in Germany and 
other European states with a strong anti-nuclear sentiment has been marginal 
thus far. Sweden has closed the first of 12 plants but seems under some 
circumstances willing to extend the life of others if necessary and, at the same 
time, has invested in the German nuclear industry. Italy, which had three 
operating plants, has closed them and depends more than ever on imported oil 
for most of its energy needs. Austria has renounced nuclear energy, but is 
surrounded by countries that rely on it. Only Finland is building a new nuclear 
power plant (the fifth) and has recently called on the EU to consider more 
emphasis on nuclear power plants. This pro-nuclear attitude is explained by the 
fact that the Scandinavian country has a relatively tough target to achieve under 
the Kyoto-Protocol and has a lot of intensive energy-consuming industries (such 
as paper and pulp). It is therefore very sensitive to energy prices on order to 
being competitive enough on the future world market. France, which is more 
dependent on nuclear power than any nation in the world, will have to decide 
in the next years whether to replace its current generation of 59 nuclear plants 
and where to store highly dangerous long-term nuclear wastes.12 
 
Meanwhile, nuclear power is also gaining new proponents in the US which is 
extending the service life of some of its 104 nuclear power plants. After the 
recent electricity crisis in California in 2001, nearly 60 percent of California’s 
residents, who have traditionally been sceptical of nuclear power, are now in 
favour of new plants.13  
In general, around the world, attitudes were beginning to shift already before 
September 11, 200114. In Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, for 
instance, there are operating 68 nuclear power plants. And in fact, the issue of 
nuclear safety in the Central and Eastern European countries waiting to join the 
EU is a major factor in the enlargement debate. Thus, for instance, the EU has 
demanded a timetable for the final closure of the Chernobyl-style plant.15 But 
for the Lithuanian government it is impossible to close the nuclear power plant 
by the suggested date of 2009.16 
 
In the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East, there are currently 84 nuclear 
reactors. A further expansion of the nuclear energy use is planned especially in 
Asia — in particular in China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and even in 
                                                 
12  See Joel Blocker, “France: Nuclear Power Meets Energy Needs and Provides Export 
Income”, RFE/RL Analyses, 22 February 1999 and Catherine Field, IHT, 26 August 2002, p. 
12. 
13  See also John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal Europe, 27 June 2001, p. 3; Julie Moffet, “United 
States: Nuclear Power Undergoing a Revival”, RFE/RL Analyses , 22 February 1999 and 
Wolfgang W. Merkel, Die Welt, 2 May 2002, p. 31. 
14  See also Barry James, IHT, 15 June 2000, p. 7; James Taylor, Financial Times, 27 June 2001, p. 
8, and Winand von Petersdorff, FAZ  (English-edition for the IHT), 14 May 2002, p. 3. 
15  See also Ron Synovitz, “The East: EU Ties Membership to Improved Nuclear Safety”, 
RFE/RL Analyses, 22 February 1999. 
16  See also Valentinas Mite, “Lithuania: EU Urges Closure of Ignalina Nuclear Plant”, RFE/RL 
Analyses, 3 April 2002. 
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some of the ASEAN states. In contrast to their expansion plans, Latin America 
and Africa account nowadays for less than 2 percent of global nuclear electricity 
capacity. 
 
Table 2 - World Electricity Balance 2000-2030 
 
2000 2010 2020 2030 
Average 
annual growth 
2000-2030 (%) 
Gross generation (TWh) 15,391 20,037 25,578 31,524 2.4 
Coal 5,989 7,143 9,075 11,590 2.2 
Oil 1,241 1,348 1,371 1,326 0.2 
Gas 2,676 4,947 7,696 9,923 4.5 
Hydrogen-fuel cells 0 0 15 349 - 
Nuclear 2,586 2,889 2,758 2,697 0.1 
Hydro 2,650 3,188 3,800 4,259 1.6 
Other renewables 249 521 863 1,381 5.9 
Own use and losses (Mtoe) 235 304 388 476 2.4 
Total final consumption (Mtoe) 1,088 1,419 1,812 2,235 2.4 
Industry 458 581 729 879 2.2 
Residential 305 408 532 674 2.7 
Services 256 341 440 548 2.6 
Other* 68 89 111 133 2.3 
* Includes transport, agriculture and non-specific uses of electricity. 
Source: OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002” (Paris 2002: OECD/IEA, 2002), here p. 124. 
In general, if the world-wide trends (not just in Asia and the former Soviet 
Union) will not change substantially, the role of nuclear power on the global 
scale will decline in the next decades. It is expected that nuclear production will 
peak at the end of this decade at around 7 percent of its share of world primary 
demand and then decline gradually to 5 percent by 2030. But as the new “World 
Energy Outlook 2002” by the OECD/IEA has pointed out, the prospects for 
nuclear power are in particular very uncertain given the new ambivalent trends 
and divided opinions in the United States and Europe.17 
 
In the light of the anti-nuclear sentiments in Europe, it remains uncertain in the 
politically most stable region in the world whether the nuclear energy will 
contribute to save the world from greenhouse effect and global climate change. 
Ironically, the civilian nuclear power programmes are particular strong in those 
states and regions which are seen politically as rather unstable. In the light of 
September 11, 2001, however, the world-wide security and safety of nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear related infrastructure has acquired new 
dimensions for the international security policy by undermining further the 
future of civilian nuclear power stations on a global scale. But as the same time, 
nuclear power is increasingly seen as a national energy source that strengthens 
the diversification of the national energy supply by making the Western and 
Asian countries less dependable from politically highly unstable oil and gas 
export regions such as the Middle East/Persian Gulf and Central Asia/Caspian 
Basin. 
                                                 
17  See OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002”, here p. 27 and 128. 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia’s Nuclear Power Programmes 
Russia has currently 29 nuclear reactors which generate 11 percent of the 
country’s electricity power. Concern over the waste in the Arctic as well as 
lingering doubt over the safety of nuclear power after the 1986 Chernobyl 
accident in Ukraine, many Russians are still wary about new nuclear power 
plant construction.18 
 
In spite of this continued concern over the safety of nuclear power, Russia is 
planning several new nuclear projects. Construction of reactors at the Kyaltin 
and Kursk nuclear power plants and at the Rostov and Yuzhno-Ural nuclear 
plants will be finished by the year 2005 according to official plans. It has also 
unveiled plans to build a new plant at Sosnovy Bor near St. Petersburg. The 
latter plant is expected also to be used not just for producing electricity, but also 
in the decommissioning of old nuclear submarine reactors now left unused in 
Russia’s part of the Arctic Sea. Russia will more than double its capacity to 
generate nuclear power of the next 20 years and to begin construction of new 
reactors with enhanced safety features. Russian experts also hope that they will 
export increasingly nuclear power to Germany and Western Europe after they 
announced to phase out their civilian use of nuclear energy.19 A major 
continuing problem for the Russian nuclear power industry is the failure of its 
customers to pay for electricity, which has contributed to a lack of resources for 
maintenance, spare parts, and salaries. 
 
Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy also intends to construct floating nuclear 
power plants in remote areas of Russian Far North and East provinces. These 
small power plants shall provide electricity and heat to regions with 
underdeveloped infrastructure or to sites of big construction projects. Those 
plants can be moved to areas struck by natural disasters or other emergencies. 
This one reason why Russian officials see in their floating nuclear power plants 
significant export chances. But given that these plants will be powered by 
reactors running on highly enriched uranium (HEU), exports to foreign 
countries will increase the global proliferation of this sensitive fissile material 
because HEU can be easier converted to weapon-grade material than low 
enriched fuels. Sceptics are also quote physical protection measures, issues of 
ownership and liability as further problems. These potential “waterborne 
Chernobyls”, which easily could also be raided by terrorists, are also posing 
many risks to the fragile Artic environment and public health — especially if 
extra radioactive waste will be dumped into the sea or on shore nearby. In these 
regions, Russian investigators found, for instance, virtually no controls over 85 
                                                 
18  See also Anthony Wesolowsky, “Russia: Nuclear Power Plans Move Forward”, RFE/RL 
Analyses, 22 February 1999 and “Russia’s Nuclear Future”, Stratfor.Com, 8 December 2000. 
19  See also Susan B. Glaser, Washington Post, 6 June 2001 (Internet-version) and Patrick E. 
Tyler, IHT, 28 May 2001, p. 5. 
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radio-thermal generators (delivering power to remote locations, such as a 
military base or a cliff-side beacon) installed in the 1960s and 1970s.20 
 
Russia has also unveiled a controversial plan — that 90 percent of Russians 
oppose in public opinion polls — to reprocess spent fuel from countries outside 
the former Communist block to raise hard currency. Under the plan, any profit 
from reprocessing waste would be used to clean up plants and improve safety. 
The price for reprocessing would be significantly less than that charged by 
French and British companies, which handle most of the reprocessing in 
Western Europe. But not only Russia’s environmentalists remain sceptical about 
the use of those funds. On the other hand, adding foreign spent fuel to the 
existing Russian stockpile might not be as so bas as the alternative: a nuclear 
waste storage crisis and no resources to deal with it. According to energy 
officials, taking in spent fuel from abroad is the only commercially sensible way 
to proceed. It is not clear thus far whether Russia intends to re-cycle the fuel for 
use in nuclear power stations or simply store it. But the United States has 
opposed those reprocessing spent fuel because the process attracts plutonium 
that could be used in nuclear weapons. For US experts it is simply “crazy to 
take more nuclear material into a country still unable to deal with nuclear waste 
it already has”.21 As the British expert Mark Galeotti has pointedly argued: 
“Russia’s slow progress in securing its stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
components is making the country one of the main potential sources of the raw 
materials for future ‘megaterrorism’.22 The liberal Russian lawmaker Sergei 
Metrokhin (from the Yabloko party) confirmed the country’s safety standards as 
“non-existent” in February 2002 after he encountered no problems entering a 
secret nuclear waste dump in Krasnoyarsk region (central Siberia) despite 
having no authorisation to be there. He warned that any terrorist can repeat his 
trick.23 
 
As the Bush Administration has officially declared, Russia’s present nuclear 
stockpile is one of the most dangerous national security threats the United 
States is facing today. It includes more than 40,000 nuclear weapons, more than 
1,000 tonnes of excess HEU enough to produce 20,000 nuclear weapons and 
vast quantities of material for biological and chemical warfare (40,000 tonnes). 
Russia has already committed itself to shipping 150,000 tonnes of low-enriched 
                                                 
20  See Anthony Wesolowsky, “Russia: Nuclear Power Plans Move Forward”; “Russia’s 
Nuclear Future”, Judith Matloff, Christian Science Monitor, 17 February 2000 (Internet-
version) and Eduard Fesko, “Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors – Proliferation Risks”, 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, 24 June 2002 (via Internet: - 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020624.htm). 
21  Quoted following Susan B. Glasser, IHT, 13 February 2001, p. 4. 
22  Mark Galleotti, “Russia’s ‘Arsenal of Megaterrorism”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 
2002, pp. 48-49. 
23  Alexander Nikolayev, Rossiya, 5 March 2002, p. 4 and Francesca Mereu, “Russia: Nuclear 
Security System Comes under Question”, RFE/RL Analyses, 18 February 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
uranium (LEU) derived from 500 tonnes of HEU from dismantled warheads to 
the United States under a 20-year agreement signed in 1993.24 
 
The recent secret joint US-Russian operation of removing weapons-grade 
uranium (45 kilograms of high-quality Yugoslav uranium enough to make as 
many as three nuclear bombs) from an ageing reactor near Belgrade as part of 
two dozen reactors in 16 countries as subjects of similar missions has confirmed 
this US threat perception.25 It was also the prime motive that the G8 meeting 
has decided to allocate US$20 billion over the next decade for the safe disposal 
of weapon’s grade plutonium stocks in Russia and the rest of the FSU. Not so 
much the theft or disappearance of nuclear warheads and “suitcase bombs” 
pose the greatest danger, but rather the possibility of nuclear materials — even 
of relatively low yield — ending up in “dirty bombs” seems a more likely 
scenario in the near future26. Thus Chechen rebels caused panic and chaos by 
planting — but not detonating — a dirty bomb using dynamite and Caesium 137 
in Moscow’s Izmailovo Park in 1996. 
 
The Russian Atomic lobby tries also to sell Russian reactors abroad such 
finishing several reactors in Iran, two others in China and building two reactors 
in India. As we all know, the United States has expressed concerns specifically 
about finishing the Bushehr reactors which could aid Iran in developing nuclear 
weapons. Since 1995, Russia’s nuclear ties with Iran have been expanded when 
Moscow signed a contract with Teheran to complete the Bushehr nuclear power 
station that Germany companies abandoned with the beginning of the “Islamic 
Revolution” in 1979. But conservative politicians and hard-liners in the Russian 
media have dismissed the US criticism by arguing that their statements are part 
of an effort to shut Moscow out of the nuclear power game.27 The Clinton-
Administration was in particular worried about Russian plans to sell expensive 
laser equipment to Iran which is suited to producing fissionable material for 
                                                 
24  See also “Managing the Global Nuclear Materials Threat. Executive Summary. A Report of 
the CSIS Project on Global Nuclear Materials Management”, Washington D.C., January 
2000; “Cooperative Science and Non-Proliferation. The ISTC/STCU Experiment”, Strategic 
Comments (ed. by the IISS, London), August 2002; Jon B. Wolfsthal/Tom Z. Collina, 
“Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia”, Survival, Summer 2002, pp. 71-83; 
“Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction. New Approaches for the Second Decade”. 
Findings Developed by a Joint Working Group (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace and the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 
November 2002), and Al J. Venter, “Soviet Nuclear Legacy Poses Deadly Threat”, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, October 1999, pp. 12-16. 
25  See John Warrick, IHT, 26 August 2002, p. 3; idem, ibid., 24-25 August 2002, pp. 1 and 5 and 
Mark Huband/James Lamont, Financial Times, 26 September 2002, p. 4. In context see also 
Lale Sabrihomuglu, “Turkey Detects Nuclear Material Trafficking”, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, August 2002, pp. 30-32. Recently, the police in Tanzania have also seized 110kg of 
suspected uranium and arrested five people – see BBC News-World Edition, 14 November 
2002. 
26  See Svetlana Babayeva, Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 June 2002, p. 5; IHT, 28 June 2002, pp. 1 and 
4; Nicolas George, Financial Times , 29-30 June 2002, p. 3; Peter Slevin, Washington Post, 25 
June 2002, p. A15. 
27  See also Peter Baker, International Herald Tribune  (IHT), 23 October 2002, p. 5. 
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bombs. In its view, it was another indicator that Iran with one of the largest oil 
and gas resources in the world wants to make nuclear weapons rather than just 
to develop commercial plants. Iran, by contrast, has denied repeatedly to 
pursue a nuclear weapons programme and has put the Bushehr plant under the 
international agency’s rules and safeguards.28 In June 2001, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry even declared to share some nuclear technology with other countries 
under the aegis of the IAEA which can fasten the construction of new nuclear 
power plants around the world that would depend on Russia for nuclear fuel 
and waste disposal. The offer includes to share the knowledge of fast 
“breeders” and “closed fuel cycles”29. In October 2001, few weeks after the 
terrorist attack in New York and Washington, Russia announced a new military 
accord with Iran to deliver conventional weapon systems, including combat 
aircraft, missiles and other weapons, reaching $300 million in annual sales over 
the next five years and to deliver next month the first of two nuclear reactors for 
a 1,000megawatt power station at Bushehr.30 Since that time, Iran has become 
the third largest arms customer of Russia (after China and India), including of 
sensitive technologies, equipment, and components for ballistic and a potential 
nuclear-weapons development. In July 2002, Russia further expanded its 
nuclear cooperation with Iran buy outlining plans to build three more reactors 
at the Bushehr site and two additional reactors (at a cost of together $8,5 billion) 
at a new nuclear power station at Ahwaz, a city 60 miles from its border with 
Iraq. These new plans openly contradicted earlier announced statements that 
Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Teheran to develop a nuclear power industry 
would end with the Bushehr-project. At the same time, the Putin -government 
tried to defuse US concerns by insisting towards Teheran that Iran has to return 
the plutonium produced as a byproduct of nuclear power generations to 
prevent it from being used in weapons and has pressed Iran to allow extensive 
IAEA inspections of the plants.31 Indeed, in the following month Iran signed an 
agreement with Iran guaranteeing the return of spent fuel from the Bushehr 
reactor.32 However, it is not clear whether this agreement also covers the two 
newly build nuclear power reactors at Ahwaz. Finally, in February this year, 
Iran announced to have begun mining uranium at Savand (200 km from the city 
of Yazd in central Iran) and planning to build two plants in the city of Isfahan 
(central Iran) and Kashan (south of Teheran) for processing the uranium to 
provide fuel for generating electricity. As sources from Iranian dissident groups 
indicate, the nuclear fuel production plant at Kashan includes two large spaces 
that are 25 feet underground!33 Meanwhile, even Chris Patten, the EU’s 
                                                 
28  See Judith Miller, New York Times, 19. September 2000 (Internet-edition). 
29  See “Russia: Offer to Share Nuclear Energy Technology May Unseat U.S. Dominance in 
Industry”, Stratfor.Com, 7 June 2001 and Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, 17 
December 2001. 
30  See Michael Wines, ibid., 3 October 2001. 
31  See Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, 26 July 2002 (Internet-edition) and Manfred 
Quiring, Die Welt, 1 August 2002, p. 5. 
32  See Michael Wines, ibid., 22 August 2002 (Internet-edition). 
33  See Nazila Fathi, ibid., 9 February 2003 (Internet-edition), Neue Zuericher Zeitung  (NZZ), 11 
February 2003, p. 2 and Frankfurter Zeitung  (FAZ), 11 February 2003, p. 6 and NTI-Global 
Security Newswire, 15 August 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
commissioner for external relations, has also accused Iran seeking to acquire 
“non-conventional weapons”34 though the EU is interested to build closer 
relations with Iran. 
 
In addition to the regular nuclear power plants, Russia and particular its capital 
Moscow have nearly 40-45 nuclear reactors functioning at various scientific 
research institutes. Many of these reactors are located in residential sections of 
Moscow which has raised concerns about the potential risk posed by ageing 
equipment and spent fuel storage.35 In general, the security and safety of many 
military facilities related to nuclear weapons is much better than civilian 
facilities with fissile material. 
 
Outside of Russia, even more dangers exist. With no other help available, 
scientists in the Georgian town Mtskheta recalled that they guarded the reactor 
with sticks and garden rakes, whilst Abkhaz separatists overran the reactor in 
Sukhumi and then apparently took two kilogramme of HEU. Until today, 
nobody knows what happened to it.36 In Armenia, the government has recently 
decided to reactivate the Metsamor nuclear plant (35 km west of the capital 
Yerevan), which provides 40 percent of the country’s annual electricity 
production, but without receiving fresh nuclear fuel after lasting but 
unsuccessful negotiations with Russia. But in contrast to the EU and its safety as 
well as security concerns of the Armenian nuclear power plant located in a 
seismically active zone and being vulnerable to technical problems and serious 
accidents, Russia has no interest that the Metsamor nuclear power plant will be 
shut down – neither for financial nor for foreign policy reasons.37 
Nuclear Power Programmes in Asia — The Rising Security Dimension 
”Nuclear trends in Asia are moving in the opposite direction. 
Asia contains the only nuclear weapon-state that is increasing its 
arsenal of nuclear and ballistic missiles (China); the two states 
which have recently chosen to declare their nuclear capabilities 
(India and Pakistan); the third (and now unique) ‘threshold 
countries’ (Israel); and the two countries found guilty of violating 
their non-proliferation commitments (Iraq and North Korea). In 
addition, South Korea and Taiwan ran military nuclear 
programmes in the 1960s and 1970s; Iran has long been suspected 
of activities prohibited under the NPT; and Japan is recognised as 
having a latent capability to produce nuclear weapons quickly. 
Lastly, the United States and Russia are major Asian powers as 
                                                 
34  See Nazila Fathi, ibid. 
35  See Valentinas Mite, “Russia: Nuclear Reactors Based in Moscow Cause Concern and 
Fears”, RFE/RL Analyses, 17 June 2002. 
36  See Joby Warrick, IHT, 21 May 2002, pp. 1 and 3. 
37  See Emil Danielyan, “Armenia: Yerevan to Relaunch Vital Nuclear Plant without Fresh 
Russian Fuel”, RFE/RL-Analyses, 16 January 2003. 
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well. Asia therefore comprises more nuclear powers or nuclear-
capable states than any other region in the world.” 
(Therèse Delpech, Director of Policy Planning at the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Paris, in an analysis of December 199838) 
Although the radioactive leak from the Tokaimura uranium-processing plant 
120 km north-east of Tokyo in 1999 was Japan’s and Asia’s worst nuclear 
accident (and the first in Asia to reach level four on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale) and simultaneously the world’s worst since the 1986 Chernobyl 
explosion, Asia’s enthusiasm for nuclear power has not been stopped. Every 
plant that began construction in 1998 was in Asia — two in China and one in 
Japan. Of the four new nuclear-power plants commissioned around the world 
in 1998, three were in South Korea.39 Seoul has indeed one of the most 
ambitious nuclear energy programmes in the region and plans to double its 
present 15 nuclear power plants until 2015. In contrast to South Korea, 
however, Taiwan’s President Chen-Shui-bian is a staunch opponent of nuclear 
power and has announced to overhaul its national energy policy40 in his 
country that is one of the least energy-efficient economies in the world. 
 
Statistics are often misleading as the case of the PR China shows. In 2001, the 
nuclear capacity for the most heavily populated country on Earth (more than 
one fifth of the present mankind) was slightly less than that of Finland. But at 
the same time, it is the biggest growth market for nuclear power. No other 
country in Asia or elsewhere in the world is expected to growth as fast as 
China. Several nuclear projects are under construction, with the involvement of 
Russian, French, and Canadian firms.  
 
The first generation unit of the Lingao nuclear power plant in Guangdong 
province began commercial operation in May 2002, with a capacity of 1-GW. 
The second 1 GW generating unit will begin operating in March 2003 according 
to the official plan. Furthermore, an additional 600-MW generating unit at the 
Qinshan nuclear power plant in Zheijang province began operation in February 
this year, and another 600-MW unit at the same site is scheduled to begin 
delivering electricity in late 2002.41 
 
Table 3 - Total Primary Energy Demand in China (Mtoe) 
 
 
1971 2000 2010 2030 
Average 
Annual Growth 
2000-2030 (%) 
Coal 192 659 854 1,278 2.2 
                                                 
38  Therèse Delpech, “Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’: Early Warning from 
Asia?”, Survival, Winter 1998-99, pp. 57-76. 
39  See Chester Dawn u.a., “Nuclear Alert for Asia”, in Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 14 
October 1999, p. 18 f. 
40  See Julian Baum, “No to Nuclear”, in FEER, 2 November 2000, p. 42. 
41  See also EIA, “China – Country Analysis Briefs”, June 2002 (via Internet – 
http:/www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html). 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil  43 236 336 578 3.0 
Gas  3 30 57 151 5.5 
Nuclear 0 4 23 63 9.3 
Hydro 3 19 29 54 3.5 
Other renewables 0 1 4 9 6.8 
Total primary energy 
demand 
241 950 1,302 2,133 2.7 
Source: OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002” (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002), here p. 249.  
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Table 4 - Electricity Generation Mix in China (TWh) 
 1971 2000 2010 2020 2030 
Coal 98 1,081 1,723 2,509 3,503 
Oil 16 46 51 53 54 
Gas 0 19 74 209 349 
Nuclear 0 17 90 163 242 
Hydro 30 222 333 511 622 
Other renewables 0 2 10 16 42 
Total 144 1,387 2,282 3,461 4,813 
Source: OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002” (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2002), here p. 249. 
 
At present, China has a capacity of 2GW, which is just generating 1 percent of 
its electricity in the year 2000 due to the long lead times and high capital cost of 
nuclear plants.42 Despite the expansion programmes of China’s civilian nuclear 
power programmes from present six nuclear power plants to 10 in the year 2010 
and 16-18 in 202543, the planned growth of nuclear energy to 11 GW in 2010, 21 
GW in 2020, and 31 GW in 2030 vis-à-vis to the anticipated national energy 
consumption will grow from 1.5 percent in the mid of the 1990s to just 4-6 
percent in 2020-2030.44 
Table 5 - Nuclear Capacity Projections for Asia 2000-2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EIA – http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/china/china. html. 
                                                 
42  See OECD/IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2002”, p. 264. 
43  See Simon Rippon, “China: Ready for More Nuclear Power”, Nuclear News, June 1995, pp. 
32-33 (via Internet – http://www.nti.org/db.nuclear/1995/n9513965.htm). 
44  See also China Daily, 7 January 2002 (Internet-version); OECD/IEA, “World Energy 
Outlook 2002”, p. 264 and in context also Frank Umbach, “China’s Energy Policy”, in 
Transatlantic Internationale Politik 2  (Summer) /2001, pp. 85-89. 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, China has now become one of seven countries that can design, build 
and manufacture nuclear power plants.45 Reportedly at the end of last October, 
for instance, China is now offering assistance and support to build Pakistan’s 
third nuclear power plant to overcome its energy shortage.46 But at the same 
time, China’s centralised political system has been undermined by mounting 
corruption and an ideological vacuum in the wake of the successful “socialist 
market reforms” during the last decade. Hence the capacity of “bad actors” to 
operate more freely has also grown in China. 
 
Given South Korea’s and Taiwan’s past nuclear weapon programmes which 
had been stopped in the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s following US 
pressure, the lingering historic distrust, suspicion, rivalry in East Asia has 
fuelled the regional arms race with an increasing access to modern weapons of 
mass destruction, particularly ballistic missiles.47 China’s increasing ballistic 
and short-range missile arsenal at the Taiwan Strait has not only increased 
threat perceptions in Taiwan, but also in Japan and India with its own rising 
numbers of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Last June, the chief secretary 
of the Japanese cabinet, Yasuo Fukuda, said that Tokyo could review its ban on 
nuclear weapons if necessary. In April before, Ichiro Ozawa, leader of Japan’s 
second-largest opposition party, caused angry comments from China when he 
said that Japan could easily make nuclear weapons and surpass China’s rising 
military might.48 
 
Table 6 - Nuclear Ambitions in North- and South Asia (in 1999) 
 
Japan South 
Korea India 
Taiwan China Pakistan 
Number of Reactors under 
Construction 
2 3 4 1 6 1 
Number of Reactors in 
Operation 
53 15 10 6 3 1 
Nuclear Share of Electricity 
Generation 36% 41% 3% 25% 1% 1% 
Source: Chester Dawson et. al., “Nuclear Alert for Asia”, in: FEER, October 14, 1999, pp. 18-19 
(19). 
 
                                                 
45  See Beijing Review , 26 February 1998. 
46  See Hindustan Times, 28 October 2002 (Internet-version). 
47  See also F. Umbach, “Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for 
Cooperation - A View from Europe”, in: Kurt W. Radtke/Raymond Feddema (Eds.), 
“Comprehensive Security in Asia. Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security 
Environment and Their Implications for Europe”, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2000, pp. 66-133, 
and idem, “Strategic Trends of Global Denuclearization and Nuclearization - Implications 
for Japan's Security Policies, Regional Stability and the TMD-Debate in East Asia”, 
Hiroshima Peace Science , No. 27, April 2001, pp. 63-118. 
48  See Michael Richardson, IHT, 6 June 2002, p. 5; David Kruger, “Never Say Nuclear”, FEER, 
4 July 2002, pp. 16-17; Brad Glosserman/Yumiko Nakagawa, “Trust Japanese Democracy”, 
PacNet-Newsletters (ed. by the CSIS-Hawaii, Honolulu), No. 26, 28 June 2002 and Robyn 
Lim, IHT, 13 June 2002, p. 8. 
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Indeed, of 17 countries with nuclear weapons or weapon programmes world-
wide, seven are in the Asia-Pacific region; of the 28 with missile programmes, 
16 are in the region; of the 16 with chemical weapons programmes, 10 are in the 
region, and of the 13 with biological weapons programmes, eight are in the 
region and more than 50 percent of potential proliferators are in the same 
according to the South Korean Defence Ministry. 
 
At present, China has the largest nuclear weapon programme as it is 
developing two ICBMs (both having a MIRV capability), a SLBM (also with a 
potential MIRV capability), a strategic nuclear submarine and air-launched 
cruise missiles (with a potential warhead configuration). Theoretically, China as 
the only declared nuclear weapons state under NPT in Asia might in the 
theoretical position to increase its nuclear arsenal from 300 to 600-900 strategic 
warheads within the next 15 years if is deploying MRV/MIRV-warheads on its 
new ICBMs and SLBMs. Given the US ballistic missile defence plans and 
Russia’s declared withdrawal from START-II which prohibited MRV/MIRV-
warheads on ICBMs49, it seems now even more likely that China may also opt 
to MRV/MIRV its new generations of ICBMs and SLBMs. But even regardless 
of this MRV/MIRV question for China’s future strategic nuclear arsenal, 
China’s rising military capabilities are already casting a shadow on the regional 
security environment and particularly on the future bilateral relationship 
between Beijing and Tokyo and can so fuel nuclear weapons ambitions in 
Taiwan and Japan or fasten and expanding those already existing in India.50 
 
In addition, the new North Korean crisis after Pyongyang has confessed on 
October 4, 2002 (the U.S. government made it public on October 16, 2002) to 
have an ongoing uranium-based nuclear weapons programme has further 
undermined the global and regional non-proliferation efforts (including the 
October 1994 Agreed Framework and the KEDO programme for the Korean 
peninsula), and regimes (such as the NPT) and has questioned again whether 
the hitherto rather limited inspections of the UN and the IAEA can really prove 
the existence and non-existence of secret nuclear weapons programmes.51 
                                                 
49  To the background see F. Umbach, “Future Military Reform: Russia’s Nuclear and 
Conventional Forces” (Camberley/Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre/Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, D65, August 2002), here p. 19ff.  
50  See also F. Umbach, “US and European Assessments of China’s Political Intentions, 
Military Capabilities, Arms Control and Non -Proliferation Policies”, Transatlantic China 
Workshop – German/European Expert Group, 9 September 2002 (forthcoming on the 
German and English web-sites of the DGAP: www.dgap.org), 25 pp.; idem, ‘‘Nuclear 
Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Cooperation - A View from 
Europe”, pp. 101 ff., and idem, “Strategic Trends of Global Denuclearization and 
Nuclearization - Implications for Japan's Security Policies, Regional Stability and the TMD-
Debate in East Asia”, pp. 86 ff. 
51  See F. Umbach, “US-Foreign and Security Policy of the Bush-Administration: Unilateralism, 
Bilateraism, Multilateralism or Minilateralism vis-à-vis North Korea and its Nuclear 
Ambition?”, paper presented at the “Asia Pacific Security Forum — 2002 Roundtable on the 
Asian Pacific Security Environment: Emerging Realities”, organized by the Institute for 
National Policy Research (INPR, Taiwan), The Pacific Forum CSIS (Hawaii,USA), Institute 
for Strategic and Development Studies (Manila, Philippines) and the Institut Français des 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 - Status of Nuclear Power and Research Reactors in the ASEAN-States 
 Power Reactor Research Reactor 
Brunei - - 
Cambodia - - 
Indonesia - 3 units in operation 
Laos - - 
Myanmar - - 
Philippines 1 unit moth-balled 1 unit under repair 
Singapore - - 
Thailand  - 1 unit in operation, 1 unit in pending 
construction 
Vietnam - 1 unit in operation 
Source original: Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (1999). 
Source here following : Mohd Zamzam Jaafar, “ASEAN”, in Paul B. Stares (Ed.), “Rethinking 
Energy Security in East Asia”, Tokyo-New York 2000, pp. 117-140 (131). 
 
Although the ASEAN countries see themselves in the use of nuclear energy 
programmes a number of problems and challenges due to the demanding and 
expensive requirements in terms of developing new infrastructure and facilities 
as well as training a disciplined and specialised workforce making nuclear 
energy rather one of the least attractive energy options especially to private-
sector companies, nuclear power planning remains attractive and ongoing 
activity.52 Thus far, the Philippines is the only ASEAN country to have built a 
nuclear power plant, albeit it has yet to be commissioned. But Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have all built a research reactor or one which 
is under construction and repair. However, all ASEAN countries are members 
of the NPT, and all except Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos are members of the 
IAEA. Furthermore, all ASEAN members signed the Treaty on the South East 
Asia Nuclear Free Zone on December 1995 and reaffirmed the Declaration on the 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) signed in 1971.53 
 
After dropping a plan in 1997 to build 12 nuclear reactors along the north coast 
of earthquake-prone Java-island which is one of the most densely populated 
regions (70% of Indonesia’s population of 210 millions) and studded with many 
active volcanoes, Indonesia has announced in January 2003 to build its first 
nuclear plant on the Muria Peninsula in central Java, beginning in 2010 and 
becoming operational in 2015.54 Given the concerns in regard to the seismically 
active region of Java, the widespread political turmoil, financial crisis, endemic 
corruption and communal violence in Indonesia — as the Islamic terrorist 
                                                                                                                                               
Relations Internationales (IFRI, Paris/France) in Hawaii, 9-10 November 2002 (the paper is 
forthcoming on the web-sites www.inpr.org.tw and www.dgap.org), 14 pp. 
52  See also Michael Roston, “Nuclear Archipelagoes? Secure Nuclear Materials in Southeast 
Asia”, PacNet-Newsletter , No. 25, 21 June 2002 and Brad Glosserman, “Solving Asia’s 
Nuclear-Waste Dilemma”, ibid., No. 24, 15 June 2001. 
53  See Mohd Zamzam Jaafar, “ASEAN”, in Paul B. Stares (Ed.), “Rethinking Energy Security 
in East Asia”, Tokyo-New York 2000, pp. 117-140. 
54  See CNN, 7 January 2003 (Internet-edition). 
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bombing on the island of Bali (which was seen until then as one of the very few 
safe heavens in the country) are not a perfect environment for operating nuclear 
power plants. 
 
Meanwhile, however, Myanmar has shown a strong interest at nuclear energy 
programmes. In December 2001, Russia announced that it will sell a nuclear 
research reactor to Burma.55 Even in the case that Myanmar may not become a 
Southeast Asian nuclear rogue state, the movement of radioactive and fissile 
materials into and out of this military state must be worrying in the light of 
widespread corruption and the risks of terrorists using improvised nuclear 
devices and “dirty bombs”. But it is questionable whether the military junta has 
the financial resources or the means to achieve its nuclear goals. But they may 
favour such an expensive programme because the possession of nuclear 
weapons can extend the already isolated regime’s importance and influence in 
the region. 
 
Moreover, Vietnam has also announced to expand its civilian programmes to 
fuel its expanding economy. But at the same time, regional security experts 
distrust Vietnam that it will use its nuclear weapon programmes just for civilian 
purposes given its historical enmity with China as the rising potential hegemon 
in the region. Hence Southeast Asia is in the need of comprehensive procedures 
for protecting, controlling, and accounting fissile materials (MPC&A) that could 
be used to build nuclear and “dirty bombs”.56 The ASEAN Declaration on Joint 
Action to Counter Terrorism of 2001 is an important step to enhance security co-
operation in the region and to commit its members to the prevention of 
terrorism, but it has failed to address nuclear risks specifically. 
                                                 
55  See also “Russia-Myanmar Reactor Leaves China on Sidelines”, Stratfor.Com, 17 May 2002. 
56  See also again Michael Roston, “Nuclear Archipelagoes? Secure Nuclear Materials in 
Southeast Asia”, and Brad Glosserman, “Solving Asia’s Nuclear-Waste Dilemma”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - Comparison of Various Proposals for an ASIATOM-Concept 
 Area of Cooperation 
Proposals 
 
Safety 
Public 
Rela-
tions 
Industry 
Coope-
ration 
Spent 
Fuel 
Mana-
gement 
Waste 
Mana-
gement 
Regional 
Safe-
guards 
Pu-
Mana-
gement 
Non-
prolife-
ration 
Export 
Control 
Nuclear 
Disarm
ament 
ASIATOM 
(Kaneko) 
X X X X X X  X X 
PACIFIATOM 
(Kano) 
X X X X X   X  
Ryukichi Imai 
(Japan) 
X  X(enrich) X X (X)    
Atsuyuki Suzuki 
(Japan) 
   X X(R&D)   (X)  
Kunio Uematsu 
(Japan) 
X   X    X  
PACATOM 
(Manning) 
X   X X X X X X 
William Dirks 
(USA) 
X   X X (X) (X) X  
Jor-San Choi 
(USA) 
X   X X X X X  
Y.M. Choi  
(S. Korea) 
X  X(R&D) X X  X X  
J. Charlson 
(Australia) 
X   X X X X X  
Source: Park, Hahnkyu “Comprehensive Security and Regional Nuclear Cooperation in East 
Asia: the Case of South Korea” Prepared for a Workshop on “Asian Concepts of 
Comprehensive Security and Their Implications for Europe” Zushi, Japan, January 23-25, 1998. 
 
Along with concerns about the rising numbers of new nuclear power plants and 
the uncertain strategic environment with historical rivalries among China, 
India, Japan, and South Korea as well as the hotspots of the Taiwan Strait and 
the Korean peninsula, there are also increasing worries over the fact that many 
of the regional nuclear power programmes have questionable oversight and 
control — often linked with poor transparency making it difficult to analyse, 
confirm and improve their safety record. The amount of radioactive waste will 
accumulate over the next two decades even if no additional nuclear capacity 
will be installed in North- and Southeast Asia. This waste will contain 450 tons 
of plutonium until 2010. The search for long-term storage facilities has already 
become a pressing issue for regional governments such as Taiwan that wanted 
to export to and store its nuclear waste either in North-Korea or Russia. Against 
this background, the proposal of an ASIATOM organisation (following the 
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EURATOM model in Europe – see table 8) is under discussion for several 
years.57 
Conclusions and Perspectives — September 11  
and the Security Implications 
The expansion of the global civilian nuclear power programmes — particularly 
in Asia, Russia and other NIS — can increase the worldwide dangers of control 
and safe storage of fissile material. But the present civilian nuclear power 
stations need to be modernized to combat effectively the risk of nuclear 
terrorism and to ensure the security and safety of nuclear facilities as well as 
material anyway as the IAEA has recommended at the end of 2001.58 The 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have highlighted new urgent 
priorities in international security and for Russia too. Although Russia employs 
physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure its weapons against an 
external threat, those measures date often from the Soviet era and are not 
designed to counter the pre-eminent threat faced today — an insider who 
attempts unauthorized actions.59 But Russia is no longer the only security 
challenge in this respect. The IAEA has found more than 100 countries having 
no minimum infrastructure in place to properly control radiation sources. 
Through its programmes to help countries improve their national facilities for 
radiation safety and security, many IAEA countries in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Europe are making progress to strengthen their capabilities to 
control and regulate radioactive sources. But more than 50 countries that are 
not IAEA member states do no benefit from IAEA assistance and experiences 
and likely to have no comparable or regulatory infrastructure at all.60 
 
Although a recent panel of 19 US nuclear experts (mostly from the nuclear 
power industry) concluded that US reactors faced no meltdown risk from a 
terrorist scenario in which hijackers might crash an airliner into a reactor61, the 
situation might be at least different in other countries and regions such as 
Russia. Its air defence, for instance, is in a critical condition and cannot 
effectively safeguard strategic sites against suicide hijacker attacks. Even the 
Chief of Russia’s Air Force, Anatoly Kornukov, admitted in an interview that a 
plane taking off somewhere in the Moscow region could hit the Kremlin before 
it could be intercepted by air defence systems because the level of combat 
                                                 
57  See F. Umbach, “Konflikt oder Kooperation in Asien -Pazifik? Chinas Einbindung in 
regionale Sicherheits strukturen und die Auswirkungen auf Europa“ (“Cooperation or 
Conflict in Asia-Pacific. China’s Tying into Regional Security Structures and the 
Implications for Europe”), (Muenchen: Oldenbourg-Verlag, 2002), here pp. 295 ff. (chapter 
6.5). See in particular also the web-site — http://www.cscap.nuctrans.org/index.htm. 
58  See Matthew Jones, Financial Times, 1-2 December 2001, p. 4. 
59  See “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities 
and Military Forces”, National Intelligence Council, Washington D.C., February 2002 
(http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/icarussiansecurity.htm). 
60  See “Controlling Radioactive Sources”, IAEA-Bulletin 44/1/2002, p. 2 f. (3). 
61  But the report has been heavily criticized by other US experts – see “Threat Assessment: 
Nuclear Plants Are at Risk, Experts Say”, Global Security Newswire, 23 September 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
readiness requires 10-12 minutes to bring it up.62 From 1994-1998, the Russian 
air defence force dramatically declined: the number of fighter aviation units 
was reduced by 2.8 times, that of air defence missile units by 2.1 times; in 2000, 
the air defence troops received only 65 percent of required funding; purchases 
of new weaponry have stopped; obsolete weaponry systems account for 65-80 
percent of the air defence troops’ armoury, and only 80 percent of the 
armament is combat ready, while Air Force units have received only between 6-
8 percent of the needed fuel. Hence, in 1999 and 2000 an average fighter pilot 
spent just 11-12 hours annually in the air. Meanwhile, nearly half of the most 
important state objects have been deprived of direct air defence missile 
protection. A few days after the terrorist attack on the United States, a Russian 
analysis warned:  
 
“... even if unprecedented measures are taken to restore the resources of 
air defence, these efforts will not result in effective protection against air 
terrorism. Russia is too vast a country, and the number of strategically 
important or hazardous facilities on its territory runs to many hundreds. 
It is impossible to supply each such site with an air defence missile 
brigade or a fighter regiment equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry 
and placed on high alert status”.63 
 
European countries, too, face similar security challenges. France, for instance, 
installed an anti-aircraft missile to protect the nuclear processing plant at La 
Hague from possible attacks by terrorists and kept 10 fighter aircraft on 24-hour 
standby.64 However, given the density of Europe’s population centres and the 
industries, the armed forces would have very limited reaction time if terrorists 
are using small aircraft flying under the radar. 
 
According to the same US expert panel of nuclear experts, terrorists could do 
little to create a public health hazard by damaging spent fuel shipments because 
it is cooled for several years before shipping to allow its temperature and 
radioactivity levels to decrease. Spent nuclear fuel cannot explode and does not 
contain radioactive liquid materials that could be released. However, 
international experts are divided in regard to the risk to the public from attacks 
on nuclear power plants — partly to the reason that the targets vulnerable to 
the widest range of threats were not nuclear but facilities where chemicals were 
manufactured and stored due to much less improved security during the last 
decade.65 But as a new analysis by David Albright, a physicist and the President 
of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington D.C., has 
convincingly argued in regard to Al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions, Bin Laden’s 
terrorist group had only limited technological capabilities in Afghanistan to 
                                                 
62  See the interview of Kornukov by Sergei Sokut, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 September 2001, p. 1. 
63  So the analysis by Mikhail Khodarenok, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 34, 14 September 
2001, p. 5. See also Nikolai Novichkov, “Russian Air Forces Facing Protracted Crisis”, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 23 January 2002, p. 4. 
64  See Victor Mallet/Robert Graham, Financial Times , 20-21 October 2001, p. 3. 
65  See also Matthew L. Wald, IHT, 25 October 2002, p. 3. 
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produce WMD, but “if it had remained in Afghanistan, it would have likely 
acquired nuclear weapons eventually”. He concluded by pointing out: 
 
“A critical lesson of the documents found in Afghanistan is that groups 
like Al Qaeda see great value in the use of nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda, 
its spin-offs, and like-minded terrorist groups can be expected to 
struggle to enhance their chances of acquiring and using nuclear 
explosives, regardless of the costs to themselves”.66 
Furthermore, those documents found and seized in Afghanistan suggest that 
Al Qaeda was seriously considering attacks on nuclear power stations in 
Europe and the United States.67 As an envoy of Chechen leader Aslan 
Maskhadov has also warned recently that future Chechen attacks in Russia may 
also include nuclear facilities as the next targets.68 Meanwhile, the United States 
and Russia have agreed to set up a joint task force to prevent radioactive 
materials from falling into the hands of terrorists to produce “dirty bombs” 
(that would not have the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, but would 
spread toxic radiation when exploded). Given the widespread worldwide 
availability of radioactive material that could be used in a dirty bomb , the 
IAEA has demanded a new “cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive 
sources to protect them against terrorism and theft.”69 
 
Furthermore, despite signs of a growing and genuine commitment PR China’s 
to non-proliferation as the introduction of a national control regime governing 
its export of missiles and missile-related technologies demonstrated last 
August, a reversal or at least a hiatus in China’s adherence to international 
norms and bilateral commitments cannot be excluded in the near- and mid-
term future. At present, for instance, Beijing’s is still unwilling to sign a 
groundbreaking international code of conduct aimed at preventing the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles (ICOC). Moreover, in the future, internal 
turmoil, persistent interagency differences, changes in U.S. foreign and security 
policies, or developments in China’s relations with other nuclear powers could 
undermine Chinese increasing willingness to participate constructively in 
international non-proliferation and export control arrangements as well as in 
regard to Beijing’s promises to enforce its non-proliferation commitments 
internally. Given these security challenges associated with the proliferation of 
destructive technologies to hostile states or terrorist groups, an intensified 
transatlantic dialogue on China and proliferation as well as with Beijing on 
these various topics should be a high priority in the future for both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
 
 
                                                 
66  David Albright, “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized 
Documents”, NAPSNET-Special Report , 19 November 2002. 
67  See ibid. and Der Tagesspiegel, 9 September 2002, p. 5. 
68  See Global Security Newswire , 30 October 2002. 
69  So the director-general of the agency, Muhammad el-Baradei – quoted following Serge 
Schmemann, NYT, 26 June 2002 (Internet-edition). 
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